approaches to creativity tend to overlook that which is specifically modern, cultural, historical, and indeed profoundly political in the constitution of their object of inquiry.
iii Perhaps one of the most suggestive properties of the word creativity is the late date of its emergence -making its first appearance as an abstract English noun in 1875, before entering into common usage a half century later.
iv Though Raymond Williams has argued that the antecedents of the discourse are to be discerned in European culture since the Renaissance -for example, Williams cites Shakespeare as one of the first English writers to apply the word creation to human imagination, but this was, to quote Macbeth, in the largely negative sense of 'A Dagger of the Mind, a false Creation,
Proceeding from the heat-oppressed Brain'. v The concept of imagination as productive and positive that is entangled in the modern meaning of the word is difficult to sustain in any popular sense before the nineteenth century -and imagination as a passive, inferior, or as Samuel Johnson put it, 'vagrant faculty,' was very much the hegemonic discourse until the arrival of Romantic discourse in the closing decades of the eighteenth century.
vi This paper argues that the discourse of creativity is more recent and complex than
Williams' hugely influential account allows. Moreover, there is a strong sense in which
Williams' text needs to be read historically, as a product of the rapid expansion of the discourse of creativity through the decades of the 1950s and 1960s -as a work that seeks to celebrate the arrival of a concept that 'we should be glad of,' as Williams puts it, rather than to cast a critical eye over its uses and origins. vii The paper also seeks to highlight the ways in which recent studies undertaken in the context of the creative industries phenomenon have continued to portray the cultural historical narrative as one of increasing perfection. Creativity, in such accounts, is something that is seen to preexist both the naming and, indeed, the thinking or understanding of the concept. For example, Williams' historical narrative is one in which certain exemplary writers come successively 'very near to' recognizing creativity for what it is viii -and more recently, for Negus and Pickering, this cultural blindness is coupled with resistance, so that it is only in the late nineteenth century that 'creativity could be explicitly named as such'.
ix
The problem is not just the way in which the recent flurry of creative industries narratives overlook developments in cultural historiography as it has been debated and practiced for the last thirty years (tending towards an old-fashioned presentation of narratives in which ideas are transmitted in unbroken lines from one 'great man' to the next, with little attempt to grapple with the problem of audience, or to look for their alleged origins in the world beyond the arts) -but also, these proliferating narratives or 'myths of origin' have the effect of eliding alternate paradigms and ideas of process that could more productively inform the contemporary debate.
Rob Pope's Creativity: Theory, History, Practice provides an interesting example, in particular his chapter 'Defining Creativity Historically', an extract of which was subsequently presented to the UK Parliamentary Committee on Creative Partnerships.
x Despite the inclusion within the book of a number of fashionably theoretical chapters composed of lists or fragments, and the slightly ponderous implications of the sections that bookend the work, viz. ' … before the beginning' and ' … after the end', Pope's chapter on history almost exactly replicates the linear arguments of his sources, which tend to be narrowly dependant on the etymology cited in the Oxford English Dictionary and Raymond Williams' Keywords. Hence Williams argues that the history of creativity from the medieval to the modern era is one of increasing 'emphasis on human activity' xi and Pope echoes that it was 'gradually and fitfully' that a 'human sense of agency' crept into the meaning of the word 'create'. xii Although Pope characterises his history as 'fitful', there is actually little that is fitful or disruptive in his narrative, which is one in which 'much more positive' xiii links and 'firm' xiv associations are made down the centuries, and in which all roads and citations lead smoothly to a climax in the present. Also problematic is the way in which Pope's argument presupposes a direct equivalence between the history of the word and the history of the idea -so much so, that his method appears to be one of extracting citations from the Oxford English Dictionary and matching them to printed sources.
There is little if any elaboration of the cultural historical context of the citations he uses, or any attempt to question the methodology that underpins the OED's selections.
Ultimately, the problem inherent in Pope's work is best summed up in the chapter's title -the way that Pope embarks on his project with the intention of 'defining creativity', xv posing an ideal signification in the present for which he then constructs an alleged origin in the past. Instead of slavish obedience, the increasingly sovereign [ie.
democratic capitalist] 'Vulgar of Mankind' were to be taught selfcontrol, and they would learn it via the 'rectifying Object', not of the Gallows but of Art.
xx
The nadir of Hartley's argument is signaled by the way in which he positions creative art as a form of disciplinary power or social control. But in the wake of the nadir (as in the classic form of the story), a clear dramatic arc begins to emerge, and the rest of the argument proceeds smoothly through crisis, to climax and resolution (or 'repurposing', as Hartley puts it) in the self fulfilling prophecy of the creative industries agenda that is laid out in rest of the book. refusing the trap of producing historical narratives based on contemporary assessments of significance that it becomes possible to explore the ways in which the very different ideas about art or writing practice embedded in the past might be used to inform and rework the future.
A Short History of Un-Creative Art
One of the problems associated with the historical study of art practice is that the cultural context of production is often unwittingly erased when historical artefacts are contemplated as 'Art' in the white space of the museum or gallery, or indeed the lecture theatre, or ubiquitous coffee table volume, so that angels cut from an altar screen, for example, or a portrait pried off the side of a municipal chest, are physically rearticulated in the exhibition space, and symbolically rearticulated within a very different system for the creation and reception of art. The consequence of this rearticulation is that the values of the modern system of the arts tend to operate as an invisible standard against which all such objects are judged or interpreted.
For example, there was no word equivalent in meaning to 'create' in Ancient Greek, the Greek word for art was techne, commonly translated as 'to make' or 'the making of things, according to rules'. xxiv In contrast to the modern idea of art being something that is conjured out of nothing (with results arriving in an 'inexplicable' or 'supernatural'
manner, according to a current OED definition of genius), the Greeks understood art as a practice that could be taught and learnt. More significantly, techne could be -and was -applied to all forms of human endeavour from verse making to shipbuilding or bricklaying, so long as it was performed with grace. This ancient concept of art, or ars as the Romans were later to call it, can be seen in contemporary expressions such as the art of cooking or the art of winemaking -the remnants of an older usage before European culture created art and craft as antonyms for one another. In this sense, it should also be noted that the opposite of techne was not art, but nature.
The middle ages inherited the classical idea of art practice, and continued to consider art as a characteristic of reason. For Thomas Aquinas, art was the 'right rule of reason', or '[rational knowledge] of things to be made'. xxv Aquinas also extended the term ars to include a broad range of productive activities, so that stonemasons and cobblers were practised in art in the same way as painters and poets. Also significant is the way in which Aquinas separated the arts into the useful and pleasurable categories, rating the functional forms of art more highly than the decorative. Poetry was considered functional because it provided instruction, and painting was considered functional in that it provided instruction for those who could not read or write. In this sense, art was understood to have a functional or didactic rather than a revelatory or purely aesthetic end. This is not because medieval society failed to delight in beautiful objects. Rather, it was because style was not deemed to be separable from content in the systematic way that it is in the modern world. Beauty was identified with the good, and beauty and Bacon is often credited with effecting the separation between reason and imagination that gave rise to the modern understanding of imagination -an understanding that the term creativity was later to encapsulate. In writing and literary studies both Dawson and
Engell give eloquent accounts of this development, while Pope inverts the premise to make a negative argument out of the same basic story. xxix However, a more critical approach reveals that the emergence of the concept of 'creative imagination' is more troubling than such tidy narratives allow.
In the sixteenth century imagination was a contentious subject. Once again, there had been no word for imagination in Ancient Greek. The closest Greek term was phantasma, which carries a more general sense of 'how things appear', such as the way the sun appears deceptively small from the vantage of the earth, or the land appears to rock from the vantage of a rowing boat. Hence Plato argued that imaginationconceived as images, appearances or copies of things -worked to seduce the mind away from reason. Aristotle, by contrast, understood mental images as the means by which the sensory world connects to reason, and though prone to error and illusion, Aristotle suggested that images nevertheless assisted reason in its proper function. The medieval scholastics continued to distrust imagination and stressed the need for imagination to be kept subordinate to reason lest it lead its owner astray. Bonaventure expressed concern that imagination abetted demonic possession, and Aquinas famously wrote, 'Demons are known to work on imagination, until everything is other than it is'. did not emerge until the mid-eighteenth century. In fact, it was not long after Bacon proposed his three categories of knowledge that his former pupil Thomas Hobbes put forward an entirely different system of classification -placing poetry together with mineralogy, optics and ethics on the one hand, and architecture together with astronomy and navigation on the other. xxxvii Of greater significance to the history of art practice was the way in which Hobbes reorganized Bacon's distinction between imagination (or 'wit', as the eighteenth century was to call it) and reason (or 'judgment'), a distinction that was to shape artistic and philosophical debates over the course of the next century.
The most common understanding of imagination in the seventeenth century was not in the form of Bacon's wayward 'messenger', but as the more prosaic capacity to reproduce images that enter the mind through the senses, primarily with reference to visual images that enter through the eye. Hobbes, for example, defined imagination as 'decaying sense,' a phrase conceived not so much as a pejorative than literal description of the condition of the mind after the remembered object is removed. xxxviii According to this view, man did not generate anything new from within the mind, but merely reproduced or recombined previously perceived objects, processes that Hobbes named simple and compound imagination, 'as when from the sight of a man at one time, and of a horse at another, we conceive in our mind a Centaure'. xxxix Reason, by contrast, depends on the apprehension of difference. For Hobbes, it is the process of discrimination through which 'men attaine to exact and perfect knowledge' by 'discerning suddainely dissimilitude in thinges that otherwise appeare the same'. 'with its key-word, 'imagination', was becoming paramount', liii or that the eighteenth century is the period in which 'a positive link is forged' between creativity and human agency, as Pope proposes liv -it might be better to characterize the eighteenth century imagination as epistemic. For art was concerned with an entirely different aim -to know. Classical art aimed to produce the true, the believable, and the probable.
Originality was understood only in the sense of typicality -of art's proximity to the great Original, which was Nature. Hence, the Augustan emphasis on order was not the product of a mechanical aesthetic, but a reflection of the perceived harmony of the classical universe. Once again, in the light of such aims, creativity, originality, and innovation as we understand them, not to mention the feelings of the artist and his artistic self-expression, were entirely irrelevant.
In finding evidence to support his argument Williams (and, following his lead, Negus Abrams once called the 'Copernican revolution in epistemology' that was the Romantic era. lxiv As Foucault has argued, the shift between the classical episteme and the modern is one in which the structure of knowledge undergoes a fundamental reversal. In the course of this reversal, imagination, once regarded as a poor cousin to reason -at best, passive, and at worst, a dangerous faculty that led to madness or delusion -becomes the primary faculty of the human mind. To overlook this shift is to miss the tension between the Enlightenment ideal of the rationally bounded individual and the Romantic myth of the unbounded autonomy of the infinite self. It is also to elide the possibility that the arrangement of knowledge that gave rise to creativity may well have been that which created the modern and anthropological subject -a new arrangement of knowledge that created man as the central subject and object of reality.
The Creative Mind
Kant is an obvious figure in this transition. It was Kant who increased the scope of the imagination in the theory of knowledge to a revolutionary degree. Just as Copernicus reversed the way people thought about the relationship of the earth to the sun, Kant reversed the way people thought about the relationship between the mind and the world of objects and experience. In a dramatic reversal of both empiricism and rationality he argued that some of the properties observed in objects might be due to the nature and constitution of the human spectator. Or, as Kant indelibly put it:
Failing of satisfactory progress in explaining the movements of the heavenly bodies on the supposition that they all revolved around the spectator, [Copernicus] tried whether he might not have better success if he made the spectator to revolve and the stars to remain at rest. lxv Kant accepts that knowledge begins with sense experience, but argues that the mind applies preexisting categories of perception -including logic, causality, substance, space and time -to the object. In this sense, the perceiving mind might be said to discover only that which it itself has partly made. With Kant, imagination ceases to be an empty storehouse for images generated by the senses, a blank sheet of paper on which the imprint of experience is placed, and begins to be understood as active and productive. Interestingly enough, it is not long after Kant, that scientists and phrenologists such as F.J. Gall, Charles Bell and Erasmus Darwin begin to elucidate the active mind in neurological terms -for the first time locating the mind in the brain, and not in the heart, the spinal column, the pineal gland, or the body as a whole.
lxvi
In English, Kant's influence manifested itself in poetry before entering into philosophy.
In particular, in the work of Samuel Taylor Coleridge imagination is seen to take the leap beyond the subject through the act of artistic creation. With Coleridge, the imagination ceases to be 'a lazy Looker-on on an external world' and is endowed with a synthetic or 'magical' power. The new discourse affects both the creation of art and its reception. Creative art is arranged in the contemplative spaces of the recently invented art museum, a centre that also becomes a storehouse for imperial plunder. In the same way, the cannon of English literature appears on the university curriculum for the very first time (for example, Oxford University did not introduce English Literature as a subject until 1875), just as music moves out of church and salon into the rarified spaces of the concert hall. The new discourse is also edged with a strange nationalistic fervor, and it is not coincidental that the OED's earliest citation of the noun 'creativity' occurs in the context of a chapter on Shakespeare as the English national poet written by a German-educated historian, with my own research locating earlier citations in historical works influenced by the prevailing nationalist/racialist interpretation of Herder. It is from this dense cultural matrix that the concept of creativity actually emerges. It a strange and remarkable birth -one that eclipses a two thousand year old tradition of art practice -and occurs in an age that prided itself on its scientific spirit, but saw fit to endow the practice of writing on paper or painting on canvas with mystical attributes.
Hence, 'Reason is to imagination as the instrument to the agent, as the body to the spirit, as the shadow to the substance,' wrote Shelley in a sentence that reverses many European art, together with means and opportunity, as art and literature programs flourish in the university cloister. In reality, the discourse of creativity is not even two hundred years old. It is more likely less -for it is only once creativity is reified and named that it makes itself available as an object for scientific study. Once named, it can be measured and dissected by psychologists and brain surgeons, and political and educational institutions can create policies for its cultivation. In this sense, the important period for the formation of the discourse might even be the twentieth century -the period in which the discourse becomes codified.
In this respect, my own preliminary research indicates that the abstract noun creativity The significance of Osborn is that he radically transfigures these ideas in order to make them compatible with a specifically nationalist enunciation of entrepreneurial capital.
The decades of the 1950s and 1960s saw an unprecedented proliferation of institutes and foundations devoted to the fostering of creativity in the US, a phenomena that J.P.
Guilford, dubbed the 'father' of creativity studies in psychology, allegedly attributed to the massive redirection of funds from the US defence budget in the wake of the 'Sputnik Shock' -the US, it was feared, was losing the Space Race because its scientists were not 'creative' enough. Shortly afterwards, Paul Torrance invented the Torrance Test (the 'creative' equivalent of the IQ test) to measure creativity in American children, an estimated one trillion dollars flooded into tertiary education institutions through the National Defense Education Act, Osborn's Creative Education Foundation received contracts from the US Air Force, and Guilford's research at the University of Southern California was funded by the US Navy. These governmentsponsored initiatives shifted the focus of the discourse once again -this time onto the identification and study of individuals and individual traits as a means to combat Soviet totalitarianism, but mobilizing those traits within a framework that placed emphasis on organizational and structural optimization, which is the most likely antecedent of creativity theories in organization and business studies today. Significantly, it is also in the decade of the 1950s that the Anglo-American word 'creativity' is imported into
European languages, such as French and German. lxxxvi In Short …
The real issue that needs to be brought to light in any study of creativity is not the history of the growing perfection of the concept, or a cultural shift from blindness to recognition, but its conditions of possibility. Creativity is an invention brought about by a particular arrangement of knowledge -and as Foucault famously argued with respect to the arrangement of knowledge that saw the birth of the humanist subject:
If those arrangements were to disappear as they appeared, if some event of which we can at the moment do no more than sense the possibility -without knowing either what its form will be or what it promises -were to cause them to crumble, as the ground of Classical thought did, at the end of the eighteenth century, then one can certainly wager that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea. 
